in the vast majority of cases have to be weighed against the lack of benefit if that satisfaction is not obtained.
This calls into question the whole concept of failure. What is meant by the failure of an implanted device? If the femoral component of a total hip replacement fractures two years after implantation, the device and therefore the procedure have clearly failed in the sense that the patient no longer has the function that he or she had a right to expect. Nobody would accept a hip replacement if they were told that it would only last two years at which time it would fracture. It hardly needs an expert to diagnose a fractured prosthesis, but it may need an expert to explain the failure and to offer an opinion as to whether it was a manufacturing defect, a surgical error or even patient abuse. Or perhaps it was none of these but rather a fact of life that cannot easily be explained. The expert's examination of all of the factors associated with this clear failure is clearly of great significance, and whilst it will encompass some objective assessment of the technological aspects, it will almost certainly also include some subjective opinions.
If another patient received a similar prosthesis and this lasts twenty years before it fractures, do we consider that as a failure? It could be argued that materials science has advanced sufficiently well for alloys of perfectly adequate fatigue life to be chosen for the stems of these prostheses such that they should never fracture. Alternatively, it could be argued that a device that rescued the patient from extreme pain and a disabling lack of mobility and gave that patient twenty years of high quality life which he would otherwise not have had, could not possibly be described as a failure, even if it did fracture at twenty years. After all, the patients own joints, developed after millions of years of evolution, failed to perform to specification; how can we, after only a few decades of development, provide guaranteed life-time successful performance in such situations? A very considerable responsibility rests with the experts who conduct the failure analysis to include all such factors in their assessment of responsibility.
These responsibilities become even more onerous and problematic when the views of an expert are translated into the legal framework of court testimony and deposition. Scientists of high quality frequently become trapped by the experienced attorney and say things they never meant to say and even say outrageous things in the heat of the courtroom. It has to be said that a number of scientists of lower quality find that they are able to handle this situation better than others and it is their style and their presentation that are more effective than their views. The professional litigation expert witness is here and many judgements are based on their courtroom skills rather than on the scientific and technical skills.
As far as the regulatory aspects are concerned, there is nothing new in the use of expert reports in submissions of files and dossiers to support applications for product registration. As the whole area of regulatory approval for devices in Europe is changing, the role of expert reports and technical assessments has yet to evolve. However, the scenario of submissions being considered by Notified Bodies, whose expertise lies solely within quality assurance procedures and not in the technical areas of medical devices, suggests that the use of expert assessors will be crucial. Again, bearing in mind the very considerable financial consequences of the approval process and also the fact that those involved in the regulatory control are themselves profit making organisations, this would point to the need for considerable professionalism and objectivity in this context.
The present conference is concerned with post-market surveillance with relevance to implant and patient tracking and device retrieval. All of the above comments from both regulatory and legal ends apply here, since surveillance of the performance of devices is an obvious common denominator.
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